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Abstract 
We show that the index of cost of living introduced by Konüs (1939) is numéraire dependent in 
a general equilibrium setting. This dependency gives rise to ambiguity situations for the 
interpretation of the index. To correct for this ambiguity we show that we need to neutralize the 
standard Konüs index using a price index. This correction eliminates the interpretational 
problem due to, and inherited from, the selection of the numéraire. We also provide a simplified 
expression of the index for the case of homothetic utilities. Two numerical examples show the 
discrepancies between the literal estimates, as they would be used under partial equilibrium, and 
the neutralized version. The discrepancies would give rise to erroneous assessments in the 
evaluation of the welfare effects resulting from the adoption of new policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Under partial equilibrium, when prices of commodities are given in nominal terms, the 
index introduced by Konüs (1939), and known as the true cost of living index, is always 
well defined provided the utility function is known. When we consider a general 
equilibrium set up, however, the representation of the equilibrium price vector is unique 
but only up to a selection of units. The selection of numéraire will therefore have an 
effect on the numerical estimates of the Konüs index since such selection will directly 
affect the ratio of minimal expenditures of consumers when equilibrium prices change. 
The main purpose of this note is to provide to the empirically oriented general 
equilibrium researcher a practical method to correct and solve the problem of the 
dependency of the Konüs index on the choice of the numéraire. If left uncorrected, this 
dependency can in fact give rise to misleading welfare evaluations of enacted policy 
alternatives.  
This note is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concept of Konüs index 
in a partial equilibrium set up. We also consider the specification of the index under the 
general class of homothetic utilities. In section 3 we show by means of two examples 
the problems arising regarding the correct interpretation of the index when we are 
placed in a general equilibrium set up. We conclude this section with a practical result 
to make the Konüs index immune to changes in the measuring units of commodities or 
monetary values. Last section concludes with some general comments and remarks. 
2. The Konüs index in partial equilibrium 
The Konüs index is an index that aims at capturing the so-called true cost of living. 
Consider a standard consumer whose preference relation satisfies all the canonical 
properties of micro theory. For a given price vector p, and utility level u, the 
expenditure function e(p, u) measures the minimal expenditure needed to attain utility 
level u. To be more precise, 
   ( , ) | ( )e p u Min px u x u   
where x is a vector of consumption goods.  
We consider two equilibrium situations with initial prices being p0 and final prices 
being p1. The true index of cost of living at u is defined by Konüs as the expenditures 
ratio: 
  
1
0
( , )
( , )
e p u
e p u
           (1) 
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In other words, it informs of the change in the minimal expenditure needed to keep the 
consumer at a given utility level u. To have a numerical estimate of the Konüs index a 
level of utility must be chosen as reference. 
There are two obvious options, initial utility u0 or final utility u1. When we choose the 
utility level at the initial equilibrium prices expression (1) becomes: 
  
1 0
0
0 0
( , )
( , )
e p u
e p u
         (2) 
Initial utility comes from the solution of the consumer’s problem at prices p0. Let x0 be 
the optimal solution vector so that u0=u(x0). Recall that by definition: 
   1 0 1 0 1 0( , ) | ( )e p u Min p x u x u p x        (3) 
since u0=u(x0) implies that x0 is feasible for the minimization problem (3). From here 
and the fact that 0 0 0 0( , )e p u p x we can write (2) as: 
 
 1 01 0 1 0 1 00
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
| ( )( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
Min p x u x ue p u p x p x
e p u e p u e p u p x


       (4) 
In conclusion, the Konüs index at initial utility is bounded above by a Laspeyres price 
index. This index is observable from available equilibrium data. 
Similar considerations would show that when we choose final utility u1 as the reference 
utility in expression (1), the Konüs index is then bounded from below by a Paasche 
price index. We omit the algebra here and just write the result: 
  
1 1 1 1
1
0 1 0 1
( , )
( , )
p x e p u
p x e p u
        (5) 
So, even if the Konüs index is not directly observable –and for this to happen we would 
need all the information on preferences that would allow us to derive the expenditure 
function– we can conclude that it has bounds that are observable from equilibrium data 
on prices and quantities.  
2.1 The case of homothetic utilities 
For linearly homogeneous utility functions (or under constant returns to scale for 
technologies) the expenditure function takes the particularly convenient form 
e(p,u)=e(p,1)u with e(p,1) being the minimal expenditure necessary to achieve a unitary 
level of utility (Varian, 1992). Less known is the fact that for the more general class of 
homothetic utility functions (such as are all the CES utility functions) the expenditure 
function turns out to be multiplicatively separable, namely e(p,u)=e(p,1)h(u), with h 
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being a monotone increasing function1. As it is known, a homothetic utility is a positive 
monotone transformation of a linearly homogenous utility function. The proof of this 
separability result is straightforward (see the Appendix).  
Thanks to this separability property in the homothetic case, the Konüs index takes the 
form: 
  
1 1 1
0 0 0
( , ) ( ,1) ( ) ( ,1)
( , ) ( ,1) ( ) ( ,1)
e p u e p h u e p
e p u e p h u e p
        (6) 
no matter what level of utility, initial u0 or final u1, we take as reference. Hence for 
homothetic functions, utility levels play no role in the index. Thus 1 0   and the 
common value for the index has Laspeyres and Paasche bounds—which are both 
observable with the appropriate prices and quantities equilibrium data: 
  
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
p x p x
p x p x
         (7) 
The interpretation of (6) is that if 1   the consumer needs to allocate more 
expenditure at equilibrium 1 than at equilibrium 0 to achieve the same level of unitary 
utility. Acquiring this basic utility level becomes more costly and, thanks to the 
homotheticity property, this extends to the actual equilibrium utility values. This has a 
negative interpretation in welfare terms. Similarly, 1  indicates the opposite, namely, 
that attaining utility becomes more affordable at the new equilibrium and this is 
considered to be beneficial for the welfare of the consumer. 
3. The Konüs index in general equilibrium 
We consider first two numerical examples to illustrate what we may call the numéraire 
dependence problem for the calculation and interpretation of the Konüs index under 
general equilibrium. Our examples are relevant to illustrate what may happens in the 
usual practice that we encounter in the applied general equilibrium methodology, where 
all prices are equal to one in the initial equilibrium, and a numeraire is chosen ( usually 
labor or capital services) for the simulated equilibria.  
Example 1 
Let us now consider the fictitious example in the Guerra-Sancho (2017) paper on the 
need to compensate the compensation variation from the influence of the numéraire. 
                                                          
1 In fact, neither of the two leading graduate level microeconomics textbooks (Varian, 1992; Mas-Colell 
et al, 1995) mentions this property of the expenditure or cost function under homotheticity.  
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We take a consumer in a general equilibrium setting who owns endowments of two 
goods ω=(2,8) and is described by a standard symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility function:  
  1 2 1 2( , )u x x x x          (8) 
We assume to begin with that initial equilibrium prices are p0=(1,1) and good 1 is the 
numéraire. The benchmark equilibrium consumption for this agent is x0=(5,5), his 
income (value of his endowment) is m0=10 and his optimal utility is u0=5. Consider now 
a shock, say a tax policy, that perturbs the equilibrium so that the new equilibrium price 
vector turns out to be p1=(1,2) with good 1 still being the numéraire. 
For the initial equilibrium p0=(1,1) we would find e(p0,1)=2. After the equilibrium is 
perturbed and good 1 is the numéraire, we calculate the minimal expenditure for unitary 
utility at prices p1=(1,2) and obtain e(p1,1)=2.83 with the Konüs index being  =1.41 
from expression (6). Notice that  >1. 
We now change the numéraire to good 2, the price vector is now p1=(0.5,1), with 
minimal expenditure reaching e(p1,1)= 1.41 and thus  =0.71. Now we have  <1. 
Nothing has changed in the real equilibrium but the Konüs index report two numbers 
with diametrically opposite meaning. This apparent contradiction depends directly on 
the selection of units. Notice that everything has been rescaled by a factor of ½. The 
question becomes, once again, how to report the Konüs index in a way that is 
independent of the choice of numéraire.  
The answer is that we should rely on a price index to neutralize the choice of numéraire 
and then report the corrected true index of cost living. This value will be independent of 
the chosen unit of value in the general equilibrium model. Given a vector of prices, p, a 
price index p  is defined by 
1
n
j jj
p p

  with 0j   and 1 1n jj   . 
We will now define the corrected, up to the choice of numéraire, Konüs index by the 
expression: 
  
1 1
0 0
( , ) /
( , ) /
e p u p
e p u p
          (9) 
For homothetic utilities this is clearly the same as: 
  
0
1
p
p
          (10) 
Using the data in the example and taking as price index the standard mean of prices we 
would have, for good 1 being the numéraire: 
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  1 1( ,1) / 2.83/1.5 1.88e p p     
 For equilibrium 0 we would have: 
  0 0( ,1) / 2 /1 2e p p    
Let us now change the numéraire to good 2 so that equilibrium prices are now (0.5,1). 
Recall that this selection does not have any effect on real equilibrium magnitudes. In 
this case: 
  1 1( ,1) / 1.41/ 0.75 1.88e p p    
  0 0( ,1) / 2 /1 2e p p    
In both cases the corrected Konüs index would be unaffected by the selection of 
numéraire: 
  
1 1
0 0
( ,1) / 1.88 0.94
( ,1) / 2
e p p
e p p
     
With no ambiguity regarding the numéraire we can now conclude that the (corrected) 
true index of cost of living has gone down between equilibrium states 0 and 1, 1  . 
Notice that this example corresponds to the case where the underlying general 
equilibrium model is calibrated to empirical data so that all initial equilibrium prices are 
set equal to 1. In this calibrated situations, the selection of the numéraire leaves 
unaffected the denominator of the index since for any conceivable numéraire all initial 
price indices have unitary value. But as we have shown, the numerator is directly 
affected by the numéraire.  
Example 2 
We now use the well-known Shoven and Whalley general equilibrium model of 1984 in 
the Journal of Economic Literature to calculate the true index of cost of living. In this 
paper the authors do not calculate the Konüs index among their welfare indicators. Our 
computational implementation of the same SW model yields easily the results for this 
welfare indicator. Since there are two consumers (“poor” and “rich”) in their model, we 
report the Konüs index for each consumer. A glance at the SW text shows it is an 
uncalibrated model so that in this case the selection of the numéraire will affect the 
denominator in the Konüs index as well. Indeed, their initial equilibrium prices are not 
equal to 1. 
We report the results for two possible numéraire selections, labor and capital, in Table 
1. In their paper they use the price of labor as the only numéraire. We run the same 
fiscal simulation they use to illustrate the power of numerical general equilibrium. 
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[Table 1 around here] 
Reading this table, when only focusing on labor as numéraire and without the correction 
for the numéraire effect, we would conclude that the cost of living goes down for both 
consumers since the uncorrected Konüs index is  <1. Once the effect of the numéraire 
is neutralized we observe that the “rich” consumer is worse off ( >1) in the sense that 
it is more costly for him to attain the basic unitary level of utility whereas the “poor” 
consumer is better off, for exactly the opposite reason ( <1). 
When we select capital as the numéraire good, the second half of the Table shows that 
all the estimations are re-dimensioned. But now both consumers have uncorrected 
Konüs indices  >1. Clearly this cannot be the case since nothing has changed in the 
economy except the numéraire. Once we perform the correction with the price index we 
recover the correct values and verify, as expected, that they coincide with the values for 
the previous numéraire. 
3.1 A practical result 
These examples show that the neutralization of the price effects due exclusively to the 
selection of units is critical in order to have consistent estimates. A question that arises 
from these results is if there is a particular price normalization that yields a corrected 
Konüs index   equal to the definitional one  . The answer is positive and immediate. 
To simplify the reasoning and notation we focus first on the homothetic case of 
preferences because, in that case, the Konüs index has a unique value in equilibrium.  
Proposition: Let the numéraire be the price index p , i.e. 1p   . Then   . 
Indeed, this selection obviously guarantees that equilibrium prices will take values such 
that 1 0 1p p   and the conclusion follows trivially from equation (9).  
A more general solution to our problem that goes beyond the Konüs index itself goes as 
follows. Recall that the expenditure function is homogeneous of degree 1 in prices p. 
Hence ( , ) / ( / , ) ( , )e p u p e p p u e q u   and, no matter what the initial selection of 
numéraire may be, the (normalized) price vector q with /j jq p p  satisfies that its 
price index is always equal to 1, the numéraire. From here, 1 0( , ) / ( , )e q u e q u   . In 
other words, the solution to the ambiguity problem in the welfare measure requires the 
use of a price index, once a certain numéraire is selected for whatever desirability 
reasons. For the non-homothetic case, the same reasoning of the neutralization solution 
would apply but we would have two different estimates of the true index of cost of 
living depending on the chosen reference utility level, initial or final. 
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As we have seen, alternatively to the use of a corrected Könus index, we might also opt 
for the numéraire itself being any particular price index and then equilibrium prices 
would be normalized using this price index. Under such normalization, the estimated 
Könus index will directly provide the correct welfare value. However, this type of 
normalization has not been the usual methodological way to procced in numerical 
general equilibrium simulation exercises. Most often modelers have chosen a certain 
commodity, labor in the majority of cases, as the numéraire yardstick. Hence the need to 
correct, in all these cases, the derived Konüs index with the corresponding price index. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Exercises in empirical general equilibrium allow us to compare equilibrium states under 
alternative policies. An appropriate estimate of the corresponding welfare effects is of 
course necessary if we want to provide sound advice to policy makers. We should do 
away with any level of ambiguity in the interpretation of results. The Konüs index for 
measuring the true cost of living, if taken literally as in its partial equilibrium definition, 
would yield undesirable ambiguity due to the apparently innocuous choice of 
numéraire. The correction of the Konüs index via a price index solves the problem in a 
general equilibrium setting. Surely, the definition of which price index is finally chosen 
matters for the numerical estimates of the true index of cost of living under general 
equilibrium. Different price indices will yield different estimates for the (corrected) 
Konüs index but these estimates will always be unaffected by the selection of 
numéraire. There are very many possibilities in terms of price indices, as we all well 
know. For instance, the measure of inflation will be different if we use a consumer’s 
price index or any other alternate price index such as a retail price index or a producer’s 
price index. Inflation is a phenomenon that can be measured with different metrics. The 
same happens with the (corrected) estimate of the Konüs index. However, the fact that 
the Konüs index aims at measuring the cost of living of consumers suggests that a 
consumer’s price index that captures purchasing power would be the appropriate 
compensating index. In this case, moreover, the definitional Konüs index coincides with 
the one providing the correct welfare estimates as our result shows. 
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Table 1: Konüs index in the SW general equilibrium model 
Numéraire: Labor w=1 
Uncorrected: 
Final unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p1,1):     1.20376  1.13052 
Initial unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p0,1):     1.23197  1.17899 
Konüs  :    0.97710  0.95888 
 
With price index corrections: 
Final unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p1,1)/ 1p :    1.02341  0.96115 
Initial unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p0,1)/ 0p  :    1.02129  0.97737 
Konüs  :     1.00208  0.98340 
 
Numéraire: Capital r=1 
Uncorrected: 
Final unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p1,1):     1.07750  1.00255 
Initial unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p0,1):     0.89697  0.85840 
Konüs  :    1.19011  1.16792 
 
With price index corrections: 
Final unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p1,1)/ 1p :    1.02341  0.96115 
Initial unitary expenditure:   Rich consumer  Poor consumer 
e(p0,1)/ 0p :    1.02129  0.97737 
Konüs   :    1.00208  0.98340 
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Appendix: Separability of the expenditure function for homothetic utilities 
A homothetic utility is a positive monotone transformation of a linearly homogenous 
utility function. Let u be linearly homogenous and let g be a real valued function such 
that 'g >0. Then the composite function ( ) ( )g u g u  is a homothetic utility. 
Let us now assume that preferences represented by ( )g u satisfy all the “well-behaved” 
standard assumptions of micro-theory. We set up the expenditure minimization 
problem: 
  ( , ) Min | ( ( ))
x
e p u px g u x u          
By strict monotonicity of g: 
    1Min | ( ( )) Min | ( ) ( )
x x
px g u x u px u x g u        
Since u is linearly homogeneous 1 1( ) / ( ) ( / ( ))u x g u u x g u   and from here: 
  1 1Min | ( ) ( ) Min | 1)( )x x
xpx u x g u px u
g u


      
  
    
We now perform a change of variable so that 1/ ( )z x g u . Substituting and recalling 
that for given u the minimization solution is the same for z than for x: 
 
 
1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1
( )
1 1
( )Min | 1 Min | 1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) Min | 1
( ) ( )
( )Min | ( ) 1 ( ) ( ,1)
x x
x
g u
z
x g u xpx u px u
g u g u g u
x xg u p u
g u g u
g u pz u z g u e p


  

 
 
               
      
      
  
  
    
We therefore find that 1( , ) ( ,1) ( ) ( ,1) ( )e p u e p g u e p h u   with 1( ) ( )h u g u  and 
' 0h   if ' 0g  . Thus minimal expenditure is strictly increasing in u.   
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